Turns out the host, when inviting a remote device, needs to know how
many players are on it (since more than one is supported and the script
currently generates that case.) So pass to --server devices an array,
one per remote -- but don't bother when all entries are "1";
Bad programmer. And because the raw bytes form was so large it always
caused the fake sms stuff to send immediately rather than waiting for a
timer to expire -- which never happened when run by the test script. So
I'm not allowing any timer for invitation-sends only.
(Another problem is that there's no mechanism in the xplat code to retry
invitation sends. That needs fixing.)
If slow network traffic has given a guest time to move tiles to the
board while the host decides its last move must be rejected, those tiles
must be removed before the rejected turn can be undone.
With reject-phonies set this will trigger the reject path.
Also init CommonPrefs in jni land since its makePhonyPct, left unitialized,
causes the robot to deliberately reverse every turn, firing an assertion that the
robot's moves are legal.
Currently detects the same as tiles not in a line and calls out to a new
util method that's currently parameter-less. On Android the option only
appears in d variants.
When a guest sends a move to the server it's not the next player's turn
until the server checks the move and rejects or accepts it. It was
possible still to manipulate the board, playing new tiles, and even to
attempt to commit them. And if the move came back rejected, the bogus
committed one would be that was cleared. Bad. So I'm just setting the
turn to -1, which disables board etc., and letting nextTurn() assigne it
after the confirmation comes back.
On each open, increment a counter. And if we're able to close without a
crash intervening, decrement. Once we're trying to open with a non-0
counter we have a bad game. Open only after warning the user.
Yikes. I used to assert, in nextTurn(), that you were in the right
state. On release builds that went away, and you were moved into the
right state regardless. The bug happened when I changed that to exit
nextTurn() without changing the state, meaning that for PHONIES_DISALLOW
the host filled up its message queue trying to communicate that the
latest move was ok, never getting out of the state that required sending
that message. The fix is simply to change the state after sending and,
guest-side, after receiving, that message.
The lock was leaking when sometimes the OS would call onStop() without
isFinishing() being true, then never use the fragment again. And never
call onDestroy(). Releasing the lock in onStop and regetting it in
onResume seems to fix, but this needs some testing and time.
The problem appears to be that the new <vector/> .xml drawable has a
greater height for purposes of layout. Specifying dimensions seems to be
the way to go, though devices may vary.
I don't know why, but in my tests the relay seems to be delivering
messages to the wrong device. The linux device detects this. It used to
assert, but now just drops the message. If this is happening on Android
it might be why I'm seeing crashes...
The problem appears to be that the new <vector/> .xml drawable has a
greater height for purposes of layout. Specifying dimensions seems to be
the way to go, though devices may vary.
reverse change in 19fa3fce05 (April 4
2019) making MainActivity singleTask, which caused starting the app to
launch the gamesList screen rather than the game that had been open when
it was moved to background. Now it's "standard," and I have to hope that
doesn't produce new problems. As I wrote back then, we'll see. More
quickly I hope.
Required redoing how I invoke the NDK. The limititations I had to hack
around before seem fixed, so this is probably better. But there will be
glitches. :-)
The common code truncates to 255 *bytes*, not chars, so this isn't even
right, but at least for ascii users it'll make it less likely that
what's typed doesn't all get sent. The right fix is to change the format
to not limit sent str len to 255 bytes. See commit 512a8e1af.
Len byte was limited to 255, but would get clipped (masked with 0xFF)
then all the string data would get written. So on receipt, the clipped
length was taken to be that of the string data, with the rest of the
string to be interpreted as something else. An array index, in this
case.
The common code truncates to 255 *bytes*, not chars, so this isn't even
right, but at least for ascii users it'll make it less likely that
what's typed doesn't all get sent. The right fix is to change the format
to not limit sent str len to 255 bytes. See commit 512a8e1af.
Len byte was limited to 255, but would get clipped (masked with 0xFF)
then all the string data would get written. So on receipt, the clipped
length was taken to be that of the string data, with the rest of the
string to be interpreted as something else. An array index, in this
case.
