prevent ub caused by misaligned stores/loads

This commit is contained in:
taiyu 2018-09-02 17:07:12 -07:00
parent 80270ba086
commit d625d68d4a
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 1373D121DBFE66C3
2 changed files with 8 additions and 8 deletions

View file

@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ struct ipc_response *ipc_recv_response(int socketfd) {
}
total = 0;
response->size = data32[0];
response->type = data32[1];
memcpy(&response->size, &data32[0], sizeof(data32[0]));
memcpy(&response->type, &data32[1], sizeof(data32[1]));
char *payload = malloc(response->size + 1);
if (!payload) {
goto error_2;
@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ char *ipc_single_command(int socketfd, uint32_t type, const char *payload, uint3
char data[ipc_header_size];
uint32_t *data32 = (uint32_t *)(data + sizeof(ipc_magic));
memcpy(data, ipc_magic, sizeof(ipc_magic));
data32[0] = *len;
data32[1] = type;
memcpy(&data32[0], len, sizeof(*len));
memcpy(&data32[1], &type, sizeof(type));
if (write(socketfd, data, ipc_header_size) == -1) {
sway_abort("Unable to send IPC header");

View file

@ -253,8 +253,8 @@ int ipc_client_handle_readable(int client_fd, uint32_t mask, void *data) {
return 0;
}
client->payload_length = buf32[0];
client->current_command = (enum ipc_command_type)buf32[1];
memcpy(&client->payload_length, &buf32[0], sizeof(buf32[0]));
memcpy(&client->current_command, &buf32[1], sizeof(buf32[1]));
if (read_available - received >= (long)client->payload_length) {
ipc_client_handle_command(client);
@ -832,8 +832,8 @@ bool ipc_send_reply(struct ipc_client *client, const char *payload, uint32_t pay
uint32_t *data32 = (uint32_t*)(data + sizeof(ipc_magic));
memcpy(data, ipc_magic, sizeof(ipc_magic));
data32[0] = payload_length;
data32[1] = client->current_command;
memcpy(&data32[0], &payload_length, sizeof(payload_length));
memcpy(&data32[1], &client->current_command, sizeof(client->current_command));
while (client->write_buffer_len + ipc_header_size + payload_length >=
client->write_buffer_size) {