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73d387f569
a/kernel-firmware-20190212_28f5f7d-noarch-1.txz: Upgraded. a/kernel-generic-4.19.21-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. a/kernel-huge-4.19.21-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. a/kernel-modules-4.19.21-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. ap/lxc-2.0.9_d3a03247-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. This update fixes a security issue where a malicious privileged container could overwrite the host binary and thus gain root-level code execution on the host. As the LXC project considers privileged containers to be unsafe no CVE has been assigned for this issue for LXC. To prevent this attack, LXC has been patched to create a temporary copy of the calling binary itself when it starts or attaches to containers. To do this LXC creates an anonymous, in-memory file using the memfd_create() system call and copies itself into the temporary in-memory file, which is then sealed to prevent further modifications. LXC then executes this sealed, in-memory file instead of the original on-disk binary. For more information, see: https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2019/q1/119 (* Security fix *) d/kernel-headers-4.19.21-x86-1.txz: Upgraded. k/kernel-source-4.19.21-noarch-1.txz: Upgraded. l/libbluray-1.1.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. l/libcap-2.26-x86_64-2.txz: Rebuilt. Don't ship static library. l/xapian-core-1.4.10-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/gnupg2-2.2.13-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/irssi-1.2.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/libassuan-2.5.3-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. x/bitmap-1.0.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. x/libXau-1.0.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. x/pixman-0.38.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. isolinux/initrd.img: Rebuilt. kernels/*: Upgraded. usb-and-pxe-installers/usbboot.img: Rebuilt. |
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.. | ||
capfaq-0.2.txt | ||
libcap-2.25.tar.sign | ||
libcap.SlackBuild | ||
libcap.url | ||
README.SLACKWARE | ||
slack-desc |
This file contains some links to additional sources of documentation available on libcap usage. POSIX 1e and 2c drafts: http://wt.xpilot.org/publications/posix.1e/download.html Olaf Kirch's article: http://www.lst.de/~okir/blackhats/node125.html Serge E. Hallyn' article: POSIX file capabilities: Parceling the power of root http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-posixcap.html?ca=dgr-lnxw06LinuxPOSIX Active development of libcap v2 is in filesystem capabilities, see: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/README