mirror of
git://slackware.nl/current.git
synced 2024-12-27 09:59:16 +01:00
8b19227b58
a/bcachefs-tools-1.7.0-x86_64-1.txz: Added.
a/kernel-generic-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-huge-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-modules-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/git-2.45.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This update fixes security issues:
Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
clone.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32002
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32004
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32020
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32021
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32465
(* Security fix *)
d/kernel-headers-6.9.0-x86-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/strace-6.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
k/kernel-source-6.9.0-noarch-2.txz: Upgraded.
BCACHEFS_FS m -> y
CRYPTO_CHACHA20 m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_POLY1305 m -> y
MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE y -> n
kde/wcslib-8.3-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
l/gdk-pixbuf2-2.42.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
ani: Reject files with multiple INA or IART chunks.
ani: Reject files with multiple anih chunks.
ani: validate chunk size.
Thanks to 0xvhp, pedrib, and Benjamin Gilbert.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48622
(* Security fix *)
l/gtk+3-3.24.42-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
n/bind-9.18.27-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This is a bugfix release.
n/popa3d-1.0.3-x86_64-8.txz: Rebuilt.
This is a bugfix release:
Build with AUTH_PAM, not AUTH_SHADOW.
Thanks to jayjwa.
x/xorg-server-xwayland-23.2.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
isolinux/initrd.img: Rebuilt.
kernels/*: Upgraded.
usb-and-pxe-installers/usbboot.img: Rebuilt.
74 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
74 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
--- ./Makefile.orig 2006-03-05 04:36:54.000000000 -0600
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+++ ./Makefile 2024-05-15 19:42:54.924020444 -0500
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@@ -5,26 +5,26 @@
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INSTALL = install -c
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CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer
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# You may use OpenSSL's MD5 routines instead of the ones supplied here
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-#CFLAGS += -DHAVE_OPENSSL
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+CFLAGS += -DHAVE_OPENSSL
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LDFLAGS = -s
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LIBS =
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# Linux with glibc, FreeBSD, NetBSD
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-#LIBS += -lcrypt
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+LIBS += -lcrypt
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# HP-UX trusted system
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#LIBS += -lsec
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# Solaris (POP_STANDALONE, POP_VIRTUAL)
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#LIBS += -lsocket -lnsl
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# PAM
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-#LIBS += -lpam
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+LIBS += -lpam
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# TCP wrappers
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#LIBS += -lwrap
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# libwrap may also want this
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#LIBS += -lnsl
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# OpenSSL (-DHAVE_OPENSSL)
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-#LIBS += -lcrypto
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+LIBS += -lcrypto
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DESTDIR =
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-PREFIX = /usr/local
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+PREFIX = /usr
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SBINDIR = $(PREFIX)/sbin
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MANDIR = $(PREFIX)/man
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--- ./params.h.orig 2006-03-05 07:18:32.000000000 -0600
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+++ ./params.h 2024-05-15 19:43:21.877021047 -0500
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
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/*
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* Are we going to be a standalone server or start via an inetd clone?
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*/
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-#define POP_STANDALONE 0
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+#define POP_STANDALONE 1
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#if POP_STANDALONE
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@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
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* A pseudo-user to run as before authentication. The user and its UID
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* must not be used for any other purpose.
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*/
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-#define POP_USER POP_SERVER
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+#define POP_USER "pop"
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/*
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* An empty directory to chroot to before authentication. The directory
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@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@
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* Note that there's no built-in password aging support.
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*/
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#define AUTH_PASSWD 0
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-#define AUTH_SHADOW 1
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-#define AUTH_PAM 0
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+#define AUTH_SHADOW 0
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+#define AUTH_PAM 1
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#define AUTH_PAM_USERPASS 0
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#define USE_LIBPAM_USERPASS 0
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@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
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*
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* #undef this for qmail-style $HOME/Mailbox mailboxes.
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*/
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-#define MAIL_SPOOL_PATH "/var/mail"
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+#define MAIL_SPOOL_PATH "/var/spool/mail"
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#ifndef MAIL_SPOOL_PATH
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/*
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