2018-05-28 21:12:29 +02:00
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#!/bin/bash
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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2018-05-28 21:12:29 +02:00
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# Copyright 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2018 Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, MN, USA
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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# All rights reserved.
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#
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# Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is
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# permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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#
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# 1. Redistributions of this script must retain the above copyright
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# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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#
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# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
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# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
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# EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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# PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
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# OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
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# WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
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# OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
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# ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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2018-05-28 21:12:29 +02:00
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cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
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PKGNAM=popa3d
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2016-06-30 22:26:57 +02:00
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VERSION=1.0.3
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Thu May 16 02:31:40 UTC 2024
a/bcachefs-tools-1.7.0-x86_64-1.txz: Added.
a/kernel-generic-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-huge-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-modules-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/git-2.45.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This update fixes security issues:
Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
clone.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32002
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32004
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32020
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32021
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32465
(* Security fix *)
d/kernel-headers-6.9.0-x86-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/strace-6.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
k/kernel-source-6.9.0-noarch-2.txz: Upgraded.
BCACHEFS_FS m -> y
CRYPTO_CHACHA20 m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_POLY1305 m -> y
MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE y -> n
kde/wcslib-8.3-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
l/gdk-pixbuf2-2.42.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
ani: Reject files with multiple INA or IART chunks.
ani: Reject files with multiple anih chunks.
ani: validate chunk size.
Thanks to 0xvhp, pedrib, and Benjamin Gilbert.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48622
(* Security fix *)
l/gtk+3-3.24.42-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
n/bind-9.18.27-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This is a bugfix release.
n/popa3d-1.0.3-x86_64-8.txz: Rebuilt.
This is a bugfix release:
Build with AUTH_PAM, not AUTH_SHADOW.
Thanks to jayjwa.
x/xorg-server-xwayland-23.2.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
isolinux/initrd.img: Rebuilt.
kernels/*: Upgraded.
usb-and-pxe-installers/usbboot.img: Rebuilt.
2024-05-16 04:31:40 +02:00
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BUILD=${BUILD:-8}
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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2011-04-25 15:37:00 +02:00
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# Automatically determine the architecture we're building on:
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if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
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case "$( uname -m )" in
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2018-05-28 21:12:29 +02:00
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i?86) export ARCH=i586 ;;
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2011-04-25 15:37:00 +02:00
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arm*) export ARCH=arm ;;
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# Unless $ARCH is already set, use uname -m for all other archs:
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*) export ARCH=$( uname -m ) ;;
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esac
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fi
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2018-05-28 21:12:29 +02:00
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# If the variable PRINT_PACKAGE_NAME is set, then this script will report what
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# the name of the created package would be, and then exit. This information
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# could be useful to other scripts.
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if [ ! -z "${PRINT_PACKAGE_NAME}" ]; then
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echo "$PKGNAM-$VERSION-$ARCH-$BUILD.txz"
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exit 0
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fi
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2018-09-21 20:51:07 +02:00
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NUMJOBS=${NUMJOBS:-" -j$(expr $(nproc) + 1) "}
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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Thu May 16 02:31:40 UTC 2024
a/bcachefs-tools-1.7.0-x86_64-1.txz: Added.
a/kernel-generic-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-huge-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-modules-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/git-2.45.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This update fixes security issues:
Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
clone.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32002
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32004
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32020
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32021
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32465
(* Security fix *)
d/kernel-headers-6.9.0-x86-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/strace-6.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
k/kernel-source-6.9.0-noarch-2.txz: Upgraded.
BCACHEFS_FS m -> y
CRYPTO_CHACHA20 m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_POLY1305 m -> y
MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE y -> n
kde/wcslib-8.3-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
l/gdk-pixbuf2-2.42.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
ani: Reject files with multiple INA or IART chunks.
ani: Reject files with multiple anih chunks.
ani: validate chunk size.
Thanks to 0xvhp, pedrib, and Benjamin Gilbert.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48622
(* Security fix *)
l/gtk+3-3.24.42-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
n/bind-9.18.27-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This is a bugfix release.
n/popa3d-1.0.3-x86_64-8.txz: Rebuilt.
This is a bugfix release:
Build with AUTH_PAM, not AUTH_SHADOW.
Thanks to jayjwa.
x/xorg-server-xwayland-23.2.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
isolinux/initrd.img: Rebuilt.
kernels/*: Upgraded.
usb-and-pxe-installers/usbboot.img: Rebuilt.
2024-05-16 04:31:40 +02:00
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if [ "$ARCH" = "i586" ]; then
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LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
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elif [ "$ARCH" = "i686" ]; then
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LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
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elif [ "$ARCH" = "s390" ]; then
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LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
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elif [ "$ARCH" = "x86_64" ]; then
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LIBDIRSUFFIX="64"
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elif [ "$ARCH" = "armv7hl" ]; then
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LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
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else
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LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
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fi
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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TMP=${TMP:-/tmp}
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PKG=$TMP/package-popa3d
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rm -rf $PKG
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mkdir -p $TMP $PKG
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cd $TMP
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rm -rf popa3d-$VERSION
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2019-08-10 21:57:17 +02:00
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tar xvf $CWD/popa3d-$VERSION.tar.?z || exit 1
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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cd popa3d-$VERSION || exit 1
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2013-11-04 18:08:47 +01:00
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Thu May 16 02:31:40 UTC 2024
a/bcachefs-tools-1.7.0-x86_64-1.txz: Added.
a/kernel-generic-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-huge-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-modules-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/git-2.45.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This update fixes security issues:
Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
clone.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32002
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32004
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32020
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32021
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32465
(* Security fix *)
d/kernel-headers-6.9.0-x86-2.txz: Upgraded.
d/strace-6.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
k/kernel-source-6.9.0-noarch-2.txz: Upgraded.
BCACHEFS_FS m -> y
CRYPTO_CHACHA20 m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC m -> y
CRYPTO_POLY1305 m -> y
MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE y -> n
kde/wcslib-8.3-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
l/gdk-pixbuf2-2.42.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
ani: Reject files with multiple INA or IART chunks.
ani: Reject files with multiple anih chunks.
ani: validate chunk size.
Thanks to 0xvhp, pedrib, and Benjamin Gilbert.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48622
(* Security fix *)
l/gtk+3-3.24.42-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
n/bind-9.18.27-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
This is a bugfix release.
n/popa3d-1.0.3-x86_64-8.txz: Rebuilt.
This is a bugfix release:
Build with AUTH_PAM, not AUTH_SHADOW.
Thanks to jayjwa.
x/xorg-server-xwayland-23.2.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
isolinux/initrd.img: Rebuilt.
kernels/*: Upgraded.
usb-and-pxe-installers/usbboot.img: Rebuilt.
2024-05-16 04:31:40 +02:00
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# Choose correct options for PAM:
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zcat $CWD/popa3d.pam.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose --backup --suffix=.orig || exit 1
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2013-11-04 18:08:47 +01:00
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2024-05-12 21:10:12 +02:00
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zcat $CWD/popa3d.gcc14.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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chown -R root:root .
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find . \
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\( -perm 777 -o -perm 775 -o -perm 711 -o -perm 555 -o -perm 511 \) \
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2019-09-30 23:08:32 +02:00
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-exec chmod 755 {} \+ -o \
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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\( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) \
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2019-09-30 23:08:32 +02:00
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-exec chmod 644 {} \+
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2009-08-26 17:00:38 +02:00
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make $NUMJOBS || make || exit 1
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# already stripped
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mkdir -p $PKG/usr/sbin
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cat popa3d > $PKG/usr/sbin/popa3d
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chmod 755 $PKG/usr/sbin/popa3d
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mkdir -p $PKG/usr/man/man8
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cat popa3d.8 | gzip -9c > $PKG/usr/man/man8/popa3d.8.gz
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# Empty directory to chroot() into. Should already be installed by aaa_base, or
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# openssh, or both:
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#mkdir -p $PKG/var/empty
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# Docs:
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mkdir -p $PKG/usr/doc/popa3d-$VERSION
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cp -a \
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CHANGES CONTACT DESIGN INSTALL LICENSE VIRTUAL \
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$PKG/usr/doc/popa3d-$VERSION
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chmod 644 $PKG/usr/doc/popa3d-$VERSION/*
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# Add install script -- this ensures pop user/group are there:
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mkdir -p $PKG/install
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zcat $CWD/doinst.sh.gz > $PKG/install/doinst.sh
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# Description:
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cat $CWD/slack-desc > $PKG/install/slack-desc
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# Build the package:
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cd $PKG
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/sbin/makepkg -l y -c n $TMP/popa3d-$VERSION-$ARCH-$BUILD.txz
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