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35 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
35 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
From 0f6a809b7c4c9a8f4adb5b25808dd68000e17aa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
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Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2013
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Subject: restrict "su -c" only when callee is not root
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Shadow 4.1.5 addressed a tty-hijacking vulnerability in "su -c"
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(CVE-2005-4890) by detaching the controlling terminal.
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Omni-directional protection is excessive and breaks commonly-used
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methods for privilege escalation. Breakage is particularly severe
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on non-PAM systems.
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This patch relaxes the restriction and only detaches the controlling
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tty when the callee is not root. After all, we are not overly concerned
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with root injecting commands to non-privileged users.
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---
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src/su.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/su.c
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+++ b/src/su.c
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@@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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set_environment (pw);
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- if (!doshell) {
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+ if (!doshell && pw->pw_uid != 0) {
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/* There is no need for a controlling terminal.
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* This avoids the callee to inject commands on
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- * the caller's tty. */
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+ * the caller's tty when the callee is not root. */
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int err = -1;
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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