Update KNOWN ISSUES and Remove Shadow Patch

Now included in 14.1 and Current

Signed-off-by: willysr <willysr@slackware-id.org>

KNOWN_ISSUES.TXT

@@ -19,34 +19,6 @@ in testing/yelp.
 You also need to rebuild some packages, since by default, the SlackBuild script is configured
 to remove help files. You can remove the --without-help-dir line to produce help files.
 
-Fri Feb 14 12:11:22 UTC 2014
-By default, gksu will not work in Slackware 14.1 since shadow has been patched
-to fix security vulnerabilities, but this caused gksu to be broken.
-See this thread on LQ for more information
-http://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/slackware-14/%5Bslackware-14-1%5D-su-c-tty-hijacking-and-some-breakage-4175486942/
-
-The solution for this problem is easy, but since it's not yet applied upstream,
-we provided a simple fix from Mancha to fix this problem.
-
-Download the shadow source from Slackware mirror site such as
-http://slackware.osuosl.org/slackware-14.1/source/a/shadow/
-or
-http://slackware.osuosl.org/slackware64-14.1/source/a/shadow/
-
-and also a patch included in testing/shadow and put it on the same folder.
-Edit the shadow.SlackBuild and add this line
-patch -p1 --verbose < $CWD/shadow-4.1.5.1_CVE-2005-4890_relax.diff || exit 1
-
-before configure line and rebuild shadow package.
-You can upgrade to the modified version by running:
-upgradepkg /tmp/shadow-4.1.5.1-i486-2.tgz
-or
-upgradepkg /tmp/shadow-4.1.5.1-x86_64-2.tgz
-
-After upgrading to the modified version, gksu will work normally.
-
-This patch will goes into Slackware 14.1 and Slackware-Current soon.
-
 Mon Jun 10 03:09:28 UTC 2013
 If you are encountering problems with Caja (MATE's file manager) opening
 directories when clicking on files in certain programs like Dropbox, Skype,

testing/shadow/shadow-4.1.5.1_CVE-2005-4890_relax.diff

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 0f6a809b7c4c9a8f4adb5b25808dd68000e17aa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
-Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2013
-Subject: restrict "su -c" only when callee is not root
-
-Shadow 4.1.5 addressed a tty-hijacking vulnerability in "su -c"
-(CVE-2005-4890) by detaching the controlling terminal.
-
-Omni-directional protection is excessive and breaks commonly-used
-methods for privilege escalation. Breakage is particularly severe
-on non-PAM systems.
-
-This patch relaxes the restriction and only detaches the controlling
-tty when the callee is not root. After all, we are not overly concerned
-with root injecting commands to non-privileged users.
-
----
- src/su.c |    4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/src/su.c
-+++ b/src/su.c
-@@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	set_environment (pw);
- 
--	if (!doshell) {
-+	if (!doshell && pw->pw_uid != 0) {
- 		/* There is no need for a controlling terminal.
- 		 * This avoids the callee to inject commands on
--		 * the caller's tty. */
-+		 * the caller's tty when the callee is not root. */
- 		int err = -1;
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM