From dfe444c0ceeebe5812d644d618d152728b3b373f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 09:48:18 +0700 Subject: [PATCH] pam: Fix 2 CVEs. Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo --- pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pam/pam.SlackBuild | 7 ++-- 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch create mode 100644 pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch diff --git a/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch b/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96fa916 --- /dev/null +++ b/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 57a1e2b274d0a6376d92ada9926e5c5741e7da20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" +Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 22:18:32 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_userdb: fix password hash comparison + +Starting with commit Linux-PAM-0-77-28-g0b3e583 that introduced hashed +passwords support in pam_userdb, hashes are compared case-insensitively. +This bug leads to accepting hashes for completely different passwords in +addition to those that should be accepted. + +Additionally, commit Linux-PAM-1_1_6-13-ge2a8187 that added support for +modern password hashes with different lengths and settings, did not +update the hash comparison accordingly, which leads to accepting +computed hashes longer than stored hashes when the latter is a prefix +of the former. + +* modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c (user_lookup): Reject the computed +hash whose length differs from the stored hash length. +Compare computed and stored hashes case-sensitively. +Fixes CVE-2013-7041. + +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/731368 +--- + modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c | 9 ++++++--- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c +index de8b5b1..ff040e6 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c ++++ b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c +@@ -222,12 +222,15 @@ user_lookup (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *database, const char *cryptmode, + } else { + cryptpw = crypt (pass, data.dptr); + +- if (cryptpw) { +- compare = strncasecmp (data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize); ++ if (cryptpw && strlen(cryptpw) == (size_t)data.dsize) { ++ compare = memcmp(data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize); + } else { + compare = -2; + if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) { +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL"); ++ if (cryptpw) ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "lengths of computed and stored hashes differ"); ++ else ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL"); + } + }; + +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch b/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2aa2de --- /dev/null +++ b/pam/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" +Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue + (ticket #27) + +pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of +the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to +avoid potential directory traversal issues. + +* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat +"." and ".." tty values as invalid. +(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser +value containing '/', as invalid. + +Fixes CVE-2014-2583. + +Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer +--- + modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c | 13 ++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c +index 5193733..b3f08b1 100644 +--- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c ++++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c +@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty) + tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1; + } + /* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */ +- if (strlen(tty) == 0) { ++ if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) { + return NULL; + } + return tty; +@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen) + if (pwd != NULL) { + ruser = pwd->pw_name; + } ++ } else { ++ /* ++ * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component ++ * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/' ++ * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues. ++ */ ++ if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") || ++ !strcmp(ruser, "..") || ++ strchr(ruser, '/')) { ++ ruser = NULL; ++ } + } + if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) { + *ruserbuf = '\0'; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/pam/pam.SlackBuild b/pam/pam.SlackBuild index ab36175..da39fb7 100644 --- a/pam/pam.SlackBuild +++ b/pam/pam.SlackBuild @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ SRCNAM=Linux-PAM PRGNAM=pam VERSION=${VERSION:-1.1.8} -BUILD=${BUILD:-1} +BUILD=${BUILD:-2} TAG=${TAG:-_csb} if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then @@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ find -L . \ \( -perm 777 -o -perm 775 -o -perm 750 -o -perm 711 -o -perm 555 \ -o -perm 511 \) -exec chmod 755 {} \; -o \ \( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 640 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 \ - -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) -exec chmod 644 {} \; + -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) -exec chmod 644 {} \; + +patch -p1 < $CWD/pam-1.1.8-cve-2013-7041.patch +patch -p1 < $CWD/pam-1.1.8-cve-2014-2583.patch CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \ CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \